Meier and O'Toole have developed an empirical model that allows scholars to test for the impact of managers on a system and its outputs. In this article I attempt to add to management theory and analysis by examining the impact of time in the system and management tenure. I use ordinary least squares to replicate and expand upon Meier and O'Toole's results, using school superintendent survey responses along with outcome measures from school districts in Texas. The most interesting results suggest that (1) networking has a much larger impact when one controls for experience with the system; (2) experience with the system has independent effects on outcomes; (3) management tenure interacts with networking, resulting in greater outcomes; and (4) new managers may find alternative (possibly deceitful) ways of affecting outcomes other than working their networks.
apprehensive of change, or do they find it easier to maneuver between network contacts in order to exploit resources?
The second theme involves the networks themselves. Does the tenure of the top manager in a bureaucratic organization tap into an underlying concept regarding the network? If the top manager has endured over time, what does this say about the network's ability to produce positive outcomes? This view speaks to the other side of ''network stability.'' How much does the job security of the leader of a system reveal about the stability of other actors in the system? Presumably, constant turnover in other nodes should not reflect well on the manager and does not bode well for her or his time in office, especially if networking matters. This analysis tests whether networking matters for public education outcomes; more specifically, it provides evidence to address ''under what circumstances'' networking matters.
The article is laid out into three main sections. The first section covers the theoretical reasoning behind the analysis; it provides a number of possible motives for why ''network tenure'' should contribute to better outcomes. The section also presents alternative beliefs concerning time spent in the network and how it may diminish innovation and decrease the benefits of network activity. The second section describes the management model used to perform the analysis and explains the data and methods. The third section contains the results, as well as an interpretation of what they mean for bureaucracies in general and what they mean for scholars interested in the dynamics of network management. It also presents some surprising findings and presents possible explanations for deviant management behavior in certain environments. interested in. Put simply, Do managers matter? And if so, when and how do managers matter?
More specifically, my interest concerns management effects through network activity. When leaders interact with others outside of the hierarchy, are they producing benefits for the organization, or are they just wasting time? Michael Howlett (2002) uses evidence from four Canadian policy sectors to show that the type of networks involved in policy change has a large influence on outcomes. Provan and Milward (1995) similarly demonstrate that the type of network structure has significant effects on outcomes in the health service industry. These are valuable pieces of research that support the study of policy networks, but they do not address the frequency of network activity and its possible consequences for outcomes. Meier and O'Toole (2001) specifically test whether the frequency of contact with ''network nodes'' has an impact on outcomes (see also O'Toole and Meier 2003a) . Using survey data collected in 1999 from the top managers of public school districts in Texas, Meier and O'Toole (2001) find that the amount of time spent interacting with both public and private network nodes has a significant and positive relationship with the district pass rate for a high-stakes exam. The more time superintendents in these districts allocated to communicating with local business leaders, other superintendents, state legislators, school board members, and the state education agency, the greater was the district pass rate. Meier and O'Toole's initial study is important because it was the first large-N study of its kind, and it specifically speaks to the frequency of network contact rather than the type. Also, the authors combine survey data with other sources to show how this type of research should progress in the future. The results from their analysis are suggestive, but they do not tell the entire story.
The present study attempts to add to both their theory and their analysis by examining the impact of time in the system and management tenure. There are many ways in which time in the network can affect the outcomes of such activity. Three theoretical reasons lead us to expect that management tenure and time in the network should have positive outcomes for the organization: the first is manager centered and has to do with getting to know the network; the second is network centered and deals with stability and network evolution; the third is the interaction of the previous components and concerns trust building in network environments. The article covers each component briefly before presenting alternative hypotheses regarding network activity outcomes.
Before continuing, it is important to qualify the extent to which we can draw causal links between networking theory and the measure used here. The strong and suggestive results reported in the article must be tempered using similar language from Meier and O'Toole: ''Clearly, this measure is simplified. It ignores all aspects of networking aside from frequency and direction-for instance, skill, reputation, and a number of strategic considerations '' (2001, 281) . But initial measurements of complex relationships like networking activity are always going to be rudimentary. Meier and O'Toole continue, ''Still, the measure taps the efforts managers choose to put into managing externally, in the network' ' (2001, 281) . The type of networking activity scholars discuss, the cooperative dynamics, and the group-produced outputs are not directly measured here. This is an important qualification but should not detract from the information contained in the indirect behavioral measurement used to operationalize the model in this and other research. Not only are these indirect measures theoretically consistent, they have, here and elsewhere, been empirically validated.
Learning about the Network
Individuals who are new to a system take some time to develop relationships with interests inside and outside the organization. Meryl Reies Louis (2001) presents a model of ''newcomer experience'' that formulates a number of hypotheses about the behavior of new actors. While the model does not speak directly to management-level individuals, it does not exclude them. Reies Louis (2001, 378) argues that newcomers face information deficiencies, exclusion from informal and influential networks, and a peripheral position of control. Michael Howlett (2002) similarly argues that new actors change the entire dynamics of a network. He (2002, 246) attributes policy change to the combination of new actors with new ideas into the system; the absence or presence of each relative to the other has manifest consequences for outcomes. This is a self-evident set of assumptions; newcomers in most settings are at a disadvantage relative to those in the organization, even if the newcomers are in a position of greater formal control.
This argument demonstrates a big difference between newcomers to hierarchal organizations (inside the system) and newcomers to networks (involving those outside the system). Agranoff and McGuire (1999b, 21) suggest that managing networks and managing hierarchies are two different activities. They explain, ''The primary activities of the network manager involve selecting the appropriate actors and resources, shaping the operating context of the network, and developing ways to cope with strategic and operational complexity '' (1999a, 1999b) . Klijn and Teisman characterize networks as games and describe the manager's less-than-optimal position by stating, ''An essential feature of network management is the assumption that all the actors involved possess a margin of liberty which they will use in the game' ' (1997, 105) . Clearly, new managers suffer relative to more mature actors in the networks. This is even more problematic in the school district setting, where interests are entrenched and issue salience is high. New superintendents may quickly become frustrated trying to deal with combative school board members or an overwhelmed and uncooperative state education bureaucracy. Conversely, more experienced superintendents have closer ties with many of their network nodes, understanding which ones need to be cajoled and which ones need to be avoided altogether.
This relationship building goes beyond management tenure, however. Time spent within the system in another capacity (as a teacher, principal, or assistant superintendent) should also serve as a comparative advantage in affecting system outcomes. Many managers have been building network relationships (as well as professional reputations) for many years in the hierarchy before even being considered superintendent candidates. These superintendents should realize the greater benefits of such (preemptive) networking once given the chance to lead. O'Toole and Meier (2003a) find that the amount of time a superintendent has spent in the district in any capacity has a significantly strong and positive relationship with outcomes, demonstrating the connection between network experience and student performance.
Network Evolution
The second theoretical link between tenure and networking outcomes has to do with the development of the network over time (Termeer and Koppenjan 1997) . Hoffman (1999) explains that issue change causes an organizational field to form around particular topics and that these organizational fields change over time relative to the changing environment.
Using content analysis of chemical industry journals in the United States, he shows that issue variation begins a process of organizational field (network) change to cope with new problems. The important insight Hoffman provides is that measuring networks at one time may not tell the entire story because the ''field'' may be at one particular stage of development. Alter and Hage (1993) use similar language to describe how the networks they observe have evolved over time.
This second theoretical argument is different from the one described in the previous section because it reasons that the tenure of the top manager is an indicator of network age. If the superintendent of a school district has been at the job for a long time (over ten years, for example), then we can assume that the district is reasonably pleased with the job she or he is doing. Of course, this does not hold in all cases, but on average, bad districts will not keep their top manager on the job for too long. The short tenure of new managers may give us extra information about the development of the network in that district. Alter and Hage (1993, 252-254) show that network age may have a deleterious effect on outcomes because rigid structures begin to replace the open exchange system that characterizes young systems. This counterhypothesis will be examined in the last part of this section, but it is important to note the development of a language that incorporates the ''age'' of a network irrespective of the experience of the manager (Alter and Hage 1993, 253) .
These ideas are all tied to network stability. If networks are like games, as Klijn and Teisman (1997) suggest, then the players should learn about one another over time. The trust that develops during repeated iterations is discussed below, but cooperation can take place even in the absence of trust. Milward and Provan (2000, 247) clarify this by bringing in the development of ''reputations'' and social structures that characterize the repeated interactions of established networks. They argue, ''At some point, an unstable network becomes stable enough to perform reasonably well while still remaining flexible and adaptive '' (2000, 253) . Like Alter and Hage, the authors warn that flexibility can become rigid over time, suggesting an alternate hypothesis, but the point remains that networks in the same policy area may be at different levels of development, and we need to account for this in our measures. In another study, Milward and Provan (1998, 217) find that network stability increased network effectiveness, even though it was not a sufficient condition for effectiveness. I argue that the manager's tenure is a good indicator of this network stability. O'Toole and Meier (2003a) come closest to testing this hypothesis by using ''time in the district'' in their stability model, but they are primarily concerned with the stability of the network nodes in their study and do not use superintendent tenure to adequately measure the top-level manager's role in developing those networks.
Building Trust
The third theoretical setting used to derive hypotheses for this study comes from the game theoretic perspective. If network interaction over time involves repeated games with players who have their own interests, then it is imperative for managers to develop trust with the respective nodes. If other network actors do not trust that the manger will fulfill her or his obligations, then the effects of network activity will be zero (or negative). O'Toole reveals that this is especially critical in network situations because ''there are fewer inducements toward cooperation and greater impediments across the multiactor array' ' (1997, 131) . While trust is important in all interactions, it takes on special significance in a network.
La Porte and Metlay (1996, 342 ) lay a good foundation for understanding trust in an unknown environment. They define trust as the ''belief that those with whom you interact will take your interests into account, even in situations where you are not in a position to recognize, evaluate, and/or thwart a potentially negative course of action by 'those trusted ''' (1996, 342 ; see also Barber 1983 for a similar definition). This is comparable to the type of environment experienced by actors in networks. The ''transaction costs of recovering trust'' are high in these environments, which promotes a cooperative atmosphere in network settings. La Porte and Metlay (1996, 345) conclude by suggesting that organizational constancy (stability) is the most important factor in promoting trust among actors.
Agranoff and McGuire make an explicit case for trust in network environments because of the relatively new interest in private/public networks: ''The ability of organizational actors to operate together within a single network is thus less dependent upon a shared belief system, ideology, and common world view than it is a shared rationale for organizing embodied in the project or program itself' ' (1999b, 29) . Clearly, time in the network is critical to building trust. This goes beyond simple time in the district; rather, it speaks to the specific position of the top manager and her or his ability to engender trust among network nodes. Not only must they trust the top manager, but also she or he must provide a means for building trust among the other actors so that the benefits of group activity will be realized.
Measuring trust in a network is difficult, so instead, this line of reasoning is included with the other two to explain why we should expect management tenure to indicate a level of trust that may not be developed between new managers and their networks. If network activity is about building outside relationships that are beneficial to the system (whether or not they are buffering or exploitative), and these relationships involve trust building and iterative games of strategic behavior, then the more interaction a manager has with the network nodes, the more developed and beneficial these relationships will be. Thus, system experience is expected to weight network interactions in favor of managers with longer tenures, and lack of experience, to hinder new managers' interactive efforts.
An Alternative Theory
As specified above, some network scholars theorize that too much time in the network may produce bureaucratic inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Milward and Provan (2000) and Alter and Hage (1993) both support the notion that network evolution can go too far. Over time, previously useful and cooperative networks may become rigid and unproductive. In fact, this is the type of structure-building and uncooperative behavior that bureaucracies often exhibit, which drew the ire of public administration scholars and contributed to the recent explosion of private/public networking (Barzelay 1992; Osborne and Gaebler 1992) . In order to gain control over a network, managers may institute formal measures, which can kill innovation and risk taking. If so, we should see no effects from networking in more mature systems because the managers (or some other network node) have taken over and reduced the group's capacity to accomplish goals. The present study argues that more experienced managers who find themselves in this situation (a network where activity is fruitless) will decrease their involvement and produce small (or no) outcomes through networking. These ideas suggest testable hypotheses; using the model and data set developed by Meier and O'Toole (2001) we can produce evidence that supports or refutes the theory. The tested hypotheses are listed below. They serve as a good summary of the theory thus far, although hypothesis 4 will be explained in the next section.
Hypotheses H 1 Network management effects will increase after controlling for time spent in the system, and system experience will have independent, positive effects on outcomes.
H 2 Management tenure (time spent in the lead position within the system) will have a positive independent effect on outcomes.
H 3 Management tenure will positively interact with network management to boost the effects of network activity on outcomes.
H 4 Because new managers' network activity will have less impact on outcomes, the effects of alternative (non-networking) outcome-oriented strategies will be greater under new managers (the converse is true for more experienced managers).
THE DATA, MODEL, AND METHODS
The hypotheses are tested in a policy area uniquely suited for this topic: public education. This policy space is highly salient and divisive, with numerous interests vying for control. The data set combines survey data from public school districts in Texas with district information provided by the Texas Education Agency (TEA) for the years 1995 through 1999 (see Meier and O'Toole 2001 for a complete description of the data set). In the U.S. education system, superintendents are the top bureaucrats at the district level (the most visual and relevant education unit in the system) and thus the most important actors in the network of public and private individuals producing district education outputs; as the linchpin between the internal and external environment, they are the network managers. Five hundred seven superintendents returned surveys that asked a number of questions regarding tenure and time in the district, as well as frequency of contact with network actors. The network array involves both public and private actors (school board members, local business leaders, the TEA, other superintendents, and state legislators). It is the variance in the frequency of interaction with this network that the measurement taps into, and it is this variance that provides a critical indirect measure of network management.
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The dependent variable is the district pass rate on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) test, a high-stakes exam that was used by the state as a performance measure to rate all schools and districts in Texas.
3 This variable is chosen because it is a good measure of system outcomes. Also, it is the top priority of almost all of the managers in the data set according to their responses to questions asking them to rank the goals of the district.
Meier and O'Toole explain that management is measured in two ways: management quality and network management. Management quality is captured as the residual from an estimation of managerial salary and has been validated in earlier work (Meier and O'Toole 2 The ''management'' aspect of the variable comes from the superintendent's position as the top-level bureaucrat in charge of bringing in new resources from the external environment. The actors are interdependent, but in this particular context, the manager is accountable for the outputs produced by the network, and it is her or his interaction with the network (or lack thereof) that I am interested in. The TAAS is no longer used in Texas; it has been replaced by a similar high-stakes exam.
2002). Managers who are paid above and beyond what is expected using a mix of reasonable predictors (education, age, race, gender, and a number of district characteristics) are considered to be of higher quality than those who are paid much less than is forecast by the model. 4 To tap into networking behavior, the superintendents were asked how frequently they interact with the five network nodes, using a six-point scale ranging from ''daily'' to ''never.'' The factor scores for the five components of the network array capture ''network management style''; all five items loaded positively on the first factor (O'Toole and Meier 2003b, 19) .
It should be reiterated that there is reason to be skeptical about the operationalization of the ''network'' captured here. Rather than a direct measure of network development or interaction, Meier and O'Toole provide an approximation of the amount of contact the manager has with her or his networking partners. A better measure of network interaction would involve tapping all of the nodes and observing the dynamics of the group (not an individual, as is the case here), but such a measure awaits future scholars who have access to a large number of organizations and their respective nodes. On the other hand, we are not uninterested in the frequency of contacts the superintendent has with her or his partners, because the superintendent is the manager of the network that produces district outputs. As a networking indicator, the measure taps into the right information from the most important individual in this context; any type of network interaction presupposes contact. It is not a perfect networking measure, but it is full of relevant information for networking scholars interested in empirical tests.
The time dynamic of the aggregate data set creates a time-series cross section that enlarges the number of observations available for analysis. The shallow pool will not give us much leverage on questions of causality, but it will provide a more complete picture of ''tenure'' and ''time in district'' networking effects over a simple cross-section design. Ordinary least squares regression with fixed effects for years is used to estimate the parameters.
THE MODEL
The O'Toole and Meier management model is discussed in greater detail in a number of earlier studies (Meier and O'Toole 2001; Meier 2003a, 2003b) . It is uniquely suited for this analysis because it allows us to test competing factors affecting system outcomes. Briefly, the model differentiates between environmental and managerial effects on outcomes. Environmental variation, like clientele characteristics and organizational constraints, are controlled for across units, allowing researchers to empirically separate the effects of managerial quality and behavior. ''M 2 '' in the model is a measurement of the manager's efforts to both buffer external shocks to the system and exploit available resources through contact and cooperation with internal and external actors (Meier and O'Toole 2001, 9) . If managers who work more with their network produce outcomes that are significantly better than those who do not, after controlling for the environmental features that help explain performance, then we can successfully implicate managerial behavior in the causal process.
In the U.S. education setting, the superintendent is accountable to elected school board members and most often bears the responsibility for performance failure. Successful managers learn how to work with the school board to find solutions to district failures, take advantage of resources from local businesses to supplement public funds, and communicate with other superintendents to learn about successful programs in other districts. Managers who are never in touch with these important network actors are likely to produce different outcomes than those who report that they are in touch with these copartners on a daily basis.
The empirical tests are just one tool, certainly not the only tool, that provides access to an extremely complicated set of phenomena. If managerial activity does not matter, or if the measure is faulty, we should find no significant effect when it is included in the tests. The null hypothesis for each test is that managerial quality and frequency of network contact will have no influence on system outcomes. The hypotheses listed above are tested using the same basic model from Meier and O'Toole (2001) , examining only the additive form (with the nonlinear effects of tenure) in this article, with modifications for time suggested above. Below are the two formal models tested:
In these equations, O t 5 outcomes at time t. These are the district's pass rate on the state's high-stakes test, The same control variables from the original authors' analysis are used except for one additional component. ''Exempt'' is the percentage of students who have been exempted from taking the TAAS test for each district for any reason. There is reason to believe that this designation is sometimes used as an alternative method of bringing up the district pass rate (Bohte and Meier 2000; Meier and Bohte n.d.) . Underperforming students who are not legally exempt from taking the test may be asked to stay home on test day or may be given a ''special ed.'' or ''limited English'' exemption.
This type of organizational ''cheating'' may not be systematic, but there is a large amount of discretion at each level of the system. Superintendents who do not tolerate the use of inappropriate exemptions will find ways to curb ''cheating,'' while others may leave the discretion in the hands of street-level bureaucrats as a way to allow the practice to continue. In order to have an impact on outcomes (immediate or prolonged) new superintendents might seek out alternative solutions to networking in order to achieve quick performance results. This variable is included in each of the analyses to indicate the level of ''alternative outcome strategies'' employed by the district as a whole.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The first part of the analysis involves a replication of Meier and O'Toole's (2001, 285) results; these are presented in the first two columns of table 1. My results are identical except for the ''Teacher Experience'' coefficient, which is marginally higher in their table. Table 1 also presents a corrected sample size, one that includes only performance and environmental observations that are appropriate for the time frame of the managerial survey responses. If a respondent had been the superintendent for less than five years (the time frame of the performance data), then the data from any of the years they had not been in that position were dropped (for example, ''three year tenure'' 5 first two years for that individual were dropped). The ''Network Management'' coefficient moves from 0.184 to 0.260 from their sample to mine when the model includes the lagged pass rate. This is In table 2 the results of the test on hypothesis 1 are included. Two measures of network experience as well as Meier and O'Toole's measure of managerial quality are included. District experience is operationalized with the number of years the respondent has been in the district in any capacity, and the number of years the respondent has been the superintendent in the district is used to measure management tenure. Both of these variables were adjusted for time in the data set so that a superintendent who had been in the district five years in 1999 was counted as being in the district ''four years'' in 1998, ''three years'' in 1997, and so on.
As the results in table 2 indicate, the number of years a respondent has been in the district in any capacity has an immediate effect on both the network management variable and the system outcomes. 5 In this model, the management coefficient moves from 0.624 (results from table 1) to 0.746 and from 0.260 to 0.283 in the models controlling for last year's TAAS pass rate. Independent of its impact on management, the amount of time a superintendent has spent in the district has significant effects on outcomes as well.
Management tenure appears to have no independent association with outcomes, but this is not a good test of hypothesis 2; its interactive relationship with management will be examined later. Management quality, however, has a strong and significant influence on test outcomes. While this relationship disappears when the lagged pass rate is included, it reappears in an interesting and consistent manner in later results.
Before presenting the full model, it would be beneficial to discuss the relationship among network management, quality, time, tenure, and the use of exemptions as an alternative tool. We wish to know if longer-tenured superintendents and higher-quality managers will network and use exemptions more often than newer superintendents. Bivariate correlation results (Appendix) indicate that more experienced and higher-quality managers will network less than younger, lower-quality managers. This relationship is again evidenced in table 3, where networking is regressed on the three other measures (as well as nine environmental controls). All three relationships are negative (though they all have very small effects on networking). This is interesting but still consistent with the theory, namely, that it is the quality of contact, not necessarily the frequency, that makes a difference for more tenured superintendents in their networks. Also of note is the tiny amount of variance explained by the twelve variables, a finding consistent with Meier and O'Toole's results and one that suggests that network management is highly contingent on individual discretion. Table 4 reports the outputs of a similar model, but one that tries to explain test exemptions rather than networking. Low-performing students can be designated as ''learning disabled'' or ''language disabled,'' or some students may be asked to refrain from coming to school on the TAAS test day. These low performers are then excluded from the district's overall pass rate. In the high-stakes atmosphere of state test performance, managers may find these alternative means of producing results more attractive than other long-term approaches. I regress four different (but highly correlated; see Appendix) test exemption measures on to the same management variables and nine environmental controls. 6 The results are consistent with Bohte and Meier (2000) , who find a large amount of leftover ''exemption variance'' unexplained by legitimate environmental causes. In fact, the results indicate that much of the discretion to ''cheat'' may come from lower-level sources (principals and teachers, unmeasured here), because the management variables have little significant impact. The more important conclusion drawn from these results is that superintendents who have longer tenures are not necessarily associated with higher levels of test exemptions when controlling for all other influences. This finding will become important later.
In order to test for interactive effects between superintendent tenure and network management, I split the sample into three groups. There are a number of ways this can be done; in a previous version of this article I split the sample by ''five years' experience as superintendent in this district'' because it is theoretically reasonable to assert that it takes about this much time to establish the kind of nodal relationships discussed at the beginning of the article. Given that the average superintendent has been managing her or his district for about five years, this split proved fruitful. 7 In this version of the article, however, I wanted to examine finer interactions between tenure and networking, so I split the sample into thirds using the 25 percent and 75 percent tenure frequencies to motivate the test.
8 This produces three samples bounded at the bottom by two years' experience and by seven The test exemption data for this test, as well as the results presented in tables 5 and 6, are for the years 1997-1999. Because of this, the sample size for these tests was reduced by about two-fifths. The results are very similar to previous findings, however (an earlier version of this article).
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Joint F-tests on the two samples indicate that they are indeed two separate groups in the population. 8 At first sight, this does not look like an even three-way split. By including the managers who had been in control for the years on the edge of the split (managers with tenures of two and seven years) in the bottom and top groups, respectively, I am able to create a well-balanced set of subsamples. Table 5 years' experience at the top (see the Appendix for a detailed summary of the tenure variable). The same results are produced whether one splits these groups into four samples as well. It is not necessarily the chosen years of the split that matter; rather, it appears that something very interesting happens from the earliest, to the average, to the latest management tenures that is causing the findings given in tables 5 and 6.
9
The first set of results uses the total percentage of students exempted from the test to measure TAAS ''cheating.'' New managers with two years of experience or less (column one) appear to be constrained by their environment. Not only do networking and quality have no impact on pass rates, but also the constant is very high and the environmental measures have significant and strong effects (results not shown). The one managerial characteristic that does distinguish these administrators, however, is the amount of time they spent in the district prior to becoming superintendent. The real impact of a standard deviation change in this variable (nine years) leads to a change in the TAAS pass rate of almost one percentage point when controlling for all other effects. The percentage of students exempted from the test is significant (one-tailed test), and its impact is large (one standard deviation change leads to about a 1 percent score increase).
In the second group, more mature managers find that networking pays off, as does ''cheating.'' More interesting here is that the constant drops from seventy-eight in the first group to fifty-three in the second group. This suggests that the samples are very different, something I cannot fully explain (the finding is not the result of outliers, nor does it go away when the sample is split into smaller groups). It also backs up the previous Joint F-tests were performed on these samples as well. The top two categories (tenure . two years) were significantly different from the other two groups; however, the newest managers were not found to be statistically different from the other two categories. Given the results, we should be cautious about interpreting the coefficients for the newest managers, but I have a great deal of confidence in differences between the top two groups. The interpretation of the results for the young managers is meant to be suggestive, not conclusive.
conjecture that results in districts with newer managers are being driven by inertia, while more mature managers have a higher variance of impacts on their districts by utilizing networking, experience, and test exemptions. Evidence from the third sample strengthens this hypothesis.
The third column completes the picture by showing the substantial effects of quality networking and good management on pass rates. More mature managers (keeping in mind that they network less) appear to have developed more beneficial (or more efficient) relationships with their networks than younger ones and continue to reap the benefits of ''cheating.'' A standard deviation change in networking is associated with a one percentage point increase in test outcomes, as is a standard deviation change in quality when controlling for all other factors. Here, ''time in the district'' regains its significance and power. Table 6 presents the results of the same model except that the dependent variable is now the percentage of students in the district with a special education test exemption.
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The results are consistent and even more vivid than those from the previous analysis. At each stage of tenure, network management increases its influence on outcomes, and young managers find that it does little to change test results. Instead, these superintendents find that cheating has a greater influence on scores, as the coefficient is significant and produces a one point increase in pass rates when an average change in exemption rates occurs. Results for the other two ''cheating'' measures (% Limited English Proficiency [LEP] and % low income exempted) are not reproduced in this article, but the low income measure results are consistent with those shown here, while those for LEP appear to be operating without any influence from either management or cheating variables altogether. This is consistent with the high correlation between ''low income'' cheating and the ''special ed.'' and ''total exemption'' measures, as well as the lower correlations between ''% LEP exempt'' and the other three variables (highlighted in the Appendix).
A similar pattern of inertia and discretion is seen as we move from one sample to the next. In the middle group, network management begins to generate effects, while the constant drops to 52 percent passing and some of the environmental variables begin to show weaker effects (results not shown). As we move to the third sample, the results show consistency with the previous table as networking and quality impacts grow in size and significance, but here the effect of cheating becomes indistinguishable from zero (results consistent with the previous version of this article using a two subsample split). Again, it is clear that we are dealing with three different samples as the constant shoots back up to 75 percent passing. I offer some possible reasons for this in the concluding remarks.
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
Meier and O'Toole's management model is validated and strengthened in every test presented here. Results in table 1 show that networking has strong and independent effects on test outcomes, even within a corrected (and reduced) sample. Results in table 2 demonstrate that when ''time in the network,'' ''management tenure,'' and ''management quality'' are included in the models the effects of networking are larger than when they are excluded. Second, management quality and time in the network have independent and positive relationships with policy outcomes. Even though higher-quality managers with longer tenure work the network less (table 3) , superintendents who have been in control of the bureaucracy longer gain more positive outcomes through networking than those who are newer to their networks (tables 5 and 4). Networking and tenure interact to weight the amount of leverage a manager has on her or his environment. Interaction with the network nodes over time increases the quality of those relationships, thus producing better results (with less interaction).
There are two surprising but provocative findings as well. The first involves a measure that was suggested by the (small) literature on alternative output strategies and was found to be significantly linked to superintendent tenure. Even though superintendents with longer tenures may ''cheat'' (or allow cheating) as frequently as others do, they do not reap the benefits of this behavior as well as those newer to the school district. Thus, newer managers get more returns for non-networking behavior, possibly because they have not established a relationship with their networks and get no investment returns on working the contacts, even though they may do it more often. Other scholars should pursue tests for alternative strategies among newer managers in networks, but presently the results speak volumes as to what can be uncovered with different measures and methods of investigation.
Second, there is something very important happening in the split samples presented here (and they appear to be truly representative of an underlying phenomenon as opposed to being an aberration of the split samples). There is a reason new managers are new to their district. Either they are new because the previous manager was doing a poor job and was fired, thus placing them in a poorly performing district that moves on inertia and is heavily reliant on bureaucratic and clientele resources (suggesting an undeveloped network), or they are new to the district because the previous manager was doing well and was promoted, producing possibly contradictory circumstances. Clearly we know the latter scenario occurs, but generally speaking it is not driving the results reported here. Thus the data speak to the frequency of the former circumstance and suggest that the factors driving performance vary over the course of a superintendent's tenure.
A new manager in a district has a small initial effects on performance because the momentum of the organization overwhelms her or his networking efforts. But over time, longer-tenured managers (more than seven years here) exert their influence over the organization, and the momentum shifts to managerial inertia. There is a reason that these managers still have their jobs, and on average it is because they have learned how to tap their network resources and continue to produce quality outcomes. The evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive in regard to these strong statements, but it appears consistently in the results.
The surprising confirmation of the idea that system development can be distinguished by managerial tenure endorses the proposal of network evolution and suggests that these networks might be at different stages of progress. The thought that top-level management tenure serves as an indicator of network development is stimulating because it provides information about the network itself, not simply the actors working in it.
11 Like the ''cheating'' finding, this is a surprising result and requires further investigation, but the current forum is insufficient. Clearly, though, network actors who have been working together for a longer period of time have overcome much of the environmental inertia that plagues new managers in new networks.
Last, the evidence soundly rejected the argument that mature networks were functioning at diseconomies of scale. More experienced managers appear to have built relationships on performance and reputation and, by definition, contribute heavily to the stability of the system while retaining the benefits of group behavior. The ''time in district'' and ''tenure'' of the top-level managers appear to be rich with information; future studies should exploit these seemingly innocuous indicators and test for weighted network effects to further explore the dynamics of cooperative behavior in public organizations. Again, in the U.S. educational context, it is the superintendent's tenure and networking activity that pertain to educational performance (as the theory and evidence demonstrate). In other settings, it may be the tenure and networking activity of that particular organization's top-level manager that may indicate network development. To be clear, the theory states that the networks help produce benefits; empirically, however, this is indicated by the manager's network activity.
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